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I. Introduction
The education of children with
disabilities is a top national priority.
In 2007, approximately 13.5  percent of
all children ages three to twenty-one
enrolled in public schools in the United
States received special education
services.1   In Illinois, the percentage
was higher at 15.4 percent, according
to the U.S. Department of Education.2
Among Illinois students ages six to
twenty-one, as reported by the State
Board  of Education, the percentage
receiving special education services
decreased slightly,3 but was still
higher than the national percentage at
14.9 percent.4
The Individual with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) is the law that
governs special education in the
United States. The IDEA guides how
states and school districts provide
early intervention, special education
and related services to eligible
children with disabilities.5  The IDEA
guarantees a "free appropriate public
education,"6   commonly referred to as
"FAPE," to those who suffer from a
hearing, speech, or visual impair-
ment, a brain injury or mental
impairment, serious emotional or
health issues, autism, or an identifi-
able learning disability.7 The IDEA
requires school districts to provide
eligible students with specialized
support and instruction in order to
address their academic needs in the
least restrictive environment possible.
The overall goal of the IDEA is to
improve the achievement of disabled
students by providing increased
access to the educational environment
and the right to be educated with their
non-disabled peers as much as
possible. The IDEA seeks to prepare
children with disabilities for further
education, employment and indepen-
dent living.
The IDEA was originally enacted by
Congress in 1975 and began as the
Education For All Handicapped
Children Act.8   The law has been
revised many times over the years,
most recently on December 3, 2004,
when President Bush signed the
Individuals with Disabilities Educa-
tion Improvement Act,9 a major
reauthorization and revision of the
IDEA. Although the new law pre-
served the basic structure of the IDEA,
it also made significant changes,
including new provisions regarding
how schools can determine whether a
child has a specific learning disability
and may receive special education
services.10
In Illinois, special education is
further governed by Article 14 of the
School Code,11  which implements the
IDEA and regulates special education
procedures in Illinois. Additionally,
Title 23, Part 226 of the Illinois
Administrative Code12  provides the
rules of the Illinois State Board of
Education (ISBE) that explain the
duties and responsibilities of both
parents and school districts in regards
to special education students in
Illinois.
ISBE adopted regulations regarding
the delivery of special education
services, which became effective June
28, 2007.13  The regulations made
many substantive changes to the
regulations concerning response to
intervention strategies (RtI),14  special
educators' workload,15   and class size
for students with disabilities.16   This
article discusses these changes and
the impact they may have on a school
district's collective bargaining obliga-
tions.
II. RtI: Response to Inter-
vention
There are fourteen categories of
eligibility under the IDEA, one of
which is "Specific Learning Disability"
("SLD").17 SLD is defined as "a
disorder in one or more of the basic
psychological processes involved in
understanding or in using language,
A. Determining if a Student is
Learning Disabled
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spoken or written, which disorder may
manifest itself in the imperfect ability
to listen, think, speak, read, write,
spell, or do mathematical calcula-
tions."18 The definition includes
conditions such as "perceptual dis-
abilities, brain injury, minimal brain
dysfunction, dyslexia, and develop-
mental aphasia"19 However, SLD
specifically excludes conditions which
are "primarily the result of visual,
hearing, or motor disabilities, of
mental retardation, of emotional
disturbance, or of environmental,
cultural, or economic disadvantage."20
The IDEA requires each State to
identify, locate and evaluate all chil-
dren with SLD's who need special
education and related services.21   For
years, schools were required to use IQ
discrepancy criteria, referred to as the
discrepancy model, to determine
whether a student was eligible for
special education services.22 The
discrepancy model uses reading and
IQ tests to determine whether a
student has a severe discrepancy
between achievement and ability.23
The discrepancy model is often
referred to as the "wait to fail" model
because when young students (typi-
cally third grade and younger) are
administered a reading test or IQ test,
they are not usually capable of
demonstrating an advanced reading
level by virtue of their age.24
Therefore, even when they perform
poorly on a reading test, their scores
are usually not significantly discrep-
ant from their intelligence levels as
measured by IQ tests.  Young students
often must "wait" until they fall
farther behind before the "discrep-
ancy" approach would formally indi-
cate the presence of a learning
disability.  This discrepancy between
their ability and achievement often
does not appear until third or fourth
grade, at which point students with
learning disabilities are generally
lagging well behind their peers.25
However, beginning in 2006, with the
release of the final regulations of the
IDEA 2004, school districts are no
longer required to follow the discrep-
ancy model, but are allowed to find
other ways to determine when a child
needs extra help.26 Because of this
change, a new approach is being
implemented throughout Illinois - and
the country - through a process called
Response to Intervention.27
B. The Alternative Method:
Response to Intervention
Response to Intervention ("RtI") has
been defined by education researchers
as "the practice of providing high-
quality instruction and interventions
matched to student need, monitoring
progress frequently to make decisions
about changes in instruction or goals,
and applying child response data to
important educational decisions."28
RtI is a research-based assessment
methodology used to identify and
assist students with learning disabili-
ties.29  As a proactive and preventative
approach to serving students, RtI is
typically based on steps or levels of
intervention and encompasses both
general and special education sys-
tems.  For example, under the RtI
approach a student who struggles with
reading would first be assigned to work
in a special, small reading group
within the classroom.  In addition, the
student's teacher would ask a reading
specialist to work one-on-one with the
student.  While the student works in
the reading group and with the
specialist, the teacher would conduct
regular assessments and monitor the
student's progress or lack thereof.  If
the student made little or no progress
despite interventions, the student
could be found eligible to receive SLD
services, even if no significant
discrepancy exists between her ability
and her achievement.  In this way, RtI
is both a mechanism to give struggling
students the opportunity to receive
additional instruction and a way to
identify SLD eligibility where the
discrepancy model would likely be
ineffective.
In 2004, when Congress reautho-
rized the IDEA, it was particularly
concerned with the discrepancy model
and the fact that learning disabilities
accounted for nearly half of all
children receiving special education
services. Congressional committees
determined that the discrepancy
model over-identified or misidentified
students whose learning difficulties
were not attributable to actual
disabilities, but rather to a lack of
proper instruction and skill develop-
ment.30 In response, Congress specifi-
cally amended the criteria for
determining special education eligibil-
ity so that special education teams
must now ensure that a student's
underachievement is not due to a lack
of appropriate instruction before
issuing a SLD designation.  IDEA
regulations now provide that in
making a determination of eligibility
"a child shall not be determined to be a
child with a disability . . . if the
determinant factor for such determi-
nation is – (i) Lack of appropriate
instruction in reading, including in
the essential components of reading
instruction… (ii) Lack of instruction
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in math; or (iii) Limited English
proficiency[.]"31
In order to ensure that a student's
underachievement is not due to a lack
of appropriate instruction, Congress
sought to promote alternative identifi-
cation methods that would more
accurately distinguish between stu-
dents with specific learning disabili-
ties and those whose learning
difficulties could be resolved with more
specific, scientifically-based interven-
tions.  As such, the federal regulations
promulgated in 2006 furthered
Congress's intent to incorporate
alternative methods, such as RtI, for
identifying children as SLD eligible.
Specifically, the new the regulations:
• Allow local schools to consider a
child's response to scientific,
research-based intervention as
part of the SLD determination
process;
• Allow States to use alternative
research-based procedures for
determining whether a child is
SLD eligible;
• Provide that States may not
require the use of a severe
discrepancy between intellectual
ability and achievement to deter-
mine whether a child has a SLD;
and
• Require schools to use State
criteria in determining whether a
child is SLD eligible.32
C. How  Response to Interven-
tion Works
Under the RtI approach, prior to
making a SLD determination special
education teams must conduct and
document repeated assessments of
achievement which reflect the
student's progress. This process
assesses the child's response to
scientific, research-based interven-
tion, and will necessarily track the
instructional strategies used and
results achieved.  Based on this data,
the team establishes a student's
performance improvement goals and
develops strategies to increase the
child's rate of learning.
While there is no single widely
practiced "model" of the RtI process, it
is generally defined as a three-tier
model of assistance that uses research-
based academic and/or behavior
assessments to incrementally
impliment more intense instruction
and interventions.33   At all stages of
the process, RtI should focus on
discovering how to make the student
more successful rather than focusing
on the student's lack of success.
The first tier of the RtI model, its
foundation, uses scientific, research-
based instructional and behavioral
practices in the general education
curriculum to screen and group
students.34   Students who are "at-risk"
are identified using universal screen-
ings, weekly progress monitoring and
the results of state or district-wide
tests.35 The students who are identi-
fied as not having met established
bench-marks then receive a set period
of supplemental instruction or inter-
ventions, generally delivered in small
groups during the student's regular
school day in the regular classroom.36
During that period, a student's
progress is closely monitored using a
curriculum-based measurement. At
the end of this period, students
showing significant progress are
generally returned to the regular
classroom program.37   Students not
showing adequate progress are moved
to the second tier of the RtI model.
At the second tier, supplemental
instruction and interventions are
provided to students who need
additional instruction.  These second
tier interventions occur in small group
settings.38  Students who continue to
show too little progress at this level of
intervention are then considered for
more intensive interventions as part of
the third tier of the RtI model.39
The third tier of the RtI model
consists of intensive instructional
interventions within the general
curriculum in order to increase an
individual student's rate of progress.
Students receive individualized, inten-
sive interventions that target the skill
areas in which the student is lacking.
After all of these intervening efforts,
students who do not respond in the
third tier are considered for special
education eligibility as required by the
IDEA.40
It is important to note that RtI is a
supplement to a comprehensive
eligibility evaluation – it does not
replace comprehensive evaluation.
The IDEA requires special education
teams to use a variety of data-
gathering tools and strategies.41
Thus, the results of RtI may be but one
component of a multifaceted evalua-
tion.  It is also worth noting that the
RtI model encompasses both general
and special education students, and,
as the National Research Center on
Learning Disabilities has recognized,
RtI's value lies in its potential ability
to provide appropriate learning experi-
ences for all students.42
D. The ISBE Regulation
As of June 28, 2007, the regulations
adopted by the ISBE specifically
endorse scientific, research-based
interventions as part of the evalua-
tions described in 34 C.F.R. §300.304.43
Indeed, the Illinois Administrative
Code requires each school district to
implement a process that determines
how a child responds to scientific,
research-based interventions.44
Also, the Illinois Administrative
Code requires each district to develop
its own plan for transitioning to the
RtI process.45   Each plan must identify
the resources the district will allocate
to this transition and include an
outline of the types of State-level
assistance the district expects to
need.46   The district's plan also must
make specific reference to the
professional development necessary
for its affected staff members to
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implement this process.47  The regula-
tion also establishes a timeline for the
implementation of this plan: it must
have been developed no later than
January 1, 2009, and each school
district must be in compliance with its
plan no later than the beginning of the
2010-2011 school year.48
On January 1, 2008, the State
Superintendent released a sample
plan outlining the nature and scope of
professional development necessary
for the State of Illinois to implement a
RtI process.49  This plan includes the
following:
1. a method of identifying school
districts that are less able to
implement RtI without technical
or financial assistance;
2. a timeframe for the provision of
training, technical assistance and
materials, or of financial resources
in order to secure and provide
support to school districts;
3. a method of allocating resources
that affords priority to districts
that may otherwise be unable to
implement RtI without diverting
support from other programs.50
E. Bargaining Implications
Unlike the new rules concerning
special educators' work loads, dis-
cussed below, the ISBE's regulations
concerning RtI do not require that the
RtI process be developed in cooperation
with an exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative. However, the effects of
decisions to implement the RtI process
and plan may be bargainable.  Unions
may seek to create a bilateral
committee composed of both labor and
management representatives to over-
see the implementation of a RtI
program.  Furthermore, unions will
likely demand compensation for
employees involved in the plan, and for
any training, additional education or
additional work that RtI might
require.  To the extent the RtI program
impacts other working conditions,
such as requiring additional work
hours for teachers, unions also might
seek to bargain about those conditions.
III. The Workload of Special
Educators
F. The ISBE Regulation
In addition to RtI, the ISBE also
made effective new rules concerning
the work load for special educators.
Section 226.735 of the Illinois Admin-
istrative Code provides that school
districts shall adopt a plan specifying
limits on the work load of its special
educators so that all services required
pursuant to a student's individualized
education program (IEP) and other
support services can be adequately
provided.51 The plan must be devel-
oped "in cooperation with" the school
district's employees, and where one
exists, with the exclusive representa-
tive of its employees in accordance
with the Illinois Educational Labor
Relations Act.52 The regulation re-
quires school districts to adopt the
work load plan that will take effect by
the 2009-2010 school year, or as soon
as possible thereafter, if a later date is
necessary to comply with a collective
bargaining agreement that is in effect
at the beginning of the 2009-2010
school year.53
The regulation also describes what
the work load plan should include.
Generally speaking, it should be based
on an analysis of the activities for
which the district's special educators
are responsible.54 While it must
encompass the following items, it need
not be limited to them:
1. individualized instruction;55
2. consultative services and other
collaboration among staff mem-
bers;56
3. attendance at IEP meetings and
other staff conferences;57  and
4. paperwork and reporting.58
Under the regulation, the number
of students served by special educators
is not addressed, nor is it limited in
any way. However, the regulation does
address the number of children served
by a speech-language pathologist,
limiting a speech pathologist's caseload
to no more than sixty (60) students.59
G. Bargaining Implications
At least one labor organization to
date has demanded bargaining pursu-
ant to this regulation, and the Illinois
Education Association has indicated
that it believes that special educators'
work loads are well-suited for
bargaining.  However, the regulation
does not indicate that the parties are
required to bargain about special
educators' work loads, nor does it
designate that their work load "plan"
is a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Instead, the regulation merely speaks
in terms of development of the plan "in
cooperation with" the exclusive repre-
sentative and "in accordance with the
[Illinois Educational Labor Relations
Act]."60 Further, while the Illinois
Educational Labor Relations Board is
respectful of the ISBE rule-making
process, it is at least questionable
whether an administrative regulation
can impose a duty to bargain that
carries the same force and legal effect
as a statute that creates such a duty.
In any event, if the work load plan
affects the wages, hours and/or other
terms and conditions of employment of
employees who are represented by a
labor organization, the school district
may have to bargain over those effects.
In addition, the regulation raises
numerous issues about the extent of
the parties' duty to bargain about this
topic. The term "special educator,"
which is not defined in the regulations,
could be identified to include teachers
as well as social workers, psycholo-
gists, and occupational and physical
therapists who also work with special
education students.  Such an expan-
sive definition would expand the scope
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of the parties' duty to bargain about
their work load.  Further, special
education services differ depending on
the number of special education
students who enroll in school each year
and the nature of their needs.  Given
the varying nature of those services,
this regulation may require the
parties to reopen negotiations about
this topic with each new school year.
This regulation clearly raises a host of
issues for collective bargaining,
including whether it imposes a duty to
bargain in the first instance, and what
the precise scope of that duty will be, if
it exists.
IV. Special Education Class Size
Finally, in addition to both RtI and
work load, the ISBE also adopted new
regulations concerning class size for
students with disabilities.
A. The ISBE Regulations – Now
and Beyond
Under the current ISBE regula-
tions, "[w]hen a [special education]
student's IEP calls for services in a
general education classroom, that
student must be served in a class that
is composed of students of whom at
least 70 percent are without IEPs, that
utilizes the general curriculum, that
is taught by an instructor certified for
regualar (general) education, and that
is not designated as a general remedial
classroom."61  A student is "considered
to require 'instructional' classes when
he or she receives special education
instruction for 50 percent of the school
day or more," and classes for these
students are subject to specific class
size limitations.62  Currently, special
education class sizes are determined
by the category of disability of the
students in the classroom.63
Beginning in 2009-2010, and be-
yond, while the definition of a general
education classroom remains the
same, the regulations redefine class
size and the total number of students a
special education teacher serves.
Going forward, “”‘class’ means any
circumstance where only students
with IEPs are served and at least one
special education teacher is assigned
and provides instruction and/or
therapy exclusively to students with
IEPs."64 Further, rather than deter-
mine class size based on the type of
disability, the ISBE now determines
class size based on the amount of time
students receive special education
services.65  The following class size
limits are established:
1. 0-20%: Classes in which all of
the students receive special educa-
tion services for twenty (20)
percent of the school day or less
shall have at least one (1) qualified
teacher for each fifteen (15)
students, although the district
may increase this number by two
(2) students with a paraprofes-
sional (total of seventeen (17)
students).66
2. 21-60%:  Each class in which
any student receives special
education services for more than
twenty (20) percent of the school
day but no more than sixty (60)
percent of the school day shall have
at least one (1) qualified teacher for
each ten (10) students, although
the district may increase this
number by five (5) students with a
paraprofessional (total of fifteen
(15) students).67
3. 61-100%:  Each class in which
any student receives special
education services for more than
sixty (60) percent of the school day
shall have at least one (1) qualified
teacher for each eight (8) students,
although the district may increase
this number by five (5) students
with a paraprofessional (total of
thirteen (13) students).68
4. Early childhood:  Each class for
children ages three through five
shall have at least one (1) qualified
teacher for each five (5) students,
although the district may increase
this number by five (5) students
with a paraprofessional.69
B. Bargaining Implications
The ISBE regulations are quite
detailed and specific, leaving virtually
nothing to be considered at the
bargaining table.  That unions will
seek to bargain over the specific
requirements established by the ISBE
regulations therefore is unlikely.
That being said, unions may seek to
include these requirements in collec-
tive bargaining agreements, thereby
making them subject to a contractual
grievance procedure, and ultimately
arbitration.  However such proposals
would not present a new bargaining
implication, as unions have routinely
sought to either limit the number of
special education students in a general
education classroom or increase wages
based on the number of special
education students in the general
education classroom for years prior to
the new ISBE regulations.70
V. Conclusion
Education serves as the means for a
child to develop herself physically,
mentally and socially. This is true for
all children, including those with
disabilities. Special education is in
place to help students with special
needs achieve a higher level of
personal self-sufficiency and success
in school and community than would
be available if the student were only
given access to a typical classroom
education.  It is clear that through the
recent changes in special education
law, legislators are putting less
emphasis on including or excluding a
student from the general education
classroom based on his or her level of
disability and more emphasis on
modifying teaching methods and
environments so that students might
be served in typical educational
environments. Because these modifi-
cations consist of changes in curricu-
lum, class size and teachers' work
loads, they will inevitably have an
impact on teacher's wages, hours and
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terms and conditions of employment,
and therefore have an impact on school
districts' collective bargaining obliga-
tions.
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In Chicago Ridge Education
Association, IEA-NEA v.Chicago
Ridge School District No. 127 1/2,
Case No. 2007-CA-0062-C (IELRB
2009), the IELRB held that the
Chicago Ridge School District commit-
ted an unfair labor practice by
unilaterally removing extended-deten-
tion duty from its collective bargain-
ing agreement with the Chicago Ridge
Education Association.
On April 5, 2007, the Association,
after losing a grievance over the same
matter, filed the instant unfair labor
practice charge. The District and
Association's 2000-2005 collective
bargaining agreement had expired,
but remained in effect while negotia-
tions for the 2005-2009 agreement
continued during the 2005-2006 school
year. The 2005-2009 collective bar-
gaining agreement contained an Extra
Duty Compensation Schedule ("Sched-
ule"), which listed various duties and
rates of pay to which teachers were
entitled for performing those duties.
The schedule originally included a
duty called "extended detention."
During 2005 negotiations, various
extra duties such as "Homework
Hotline" were recommended for
elimination from the Schedule, but
extended detention duty was never so
recommended.  A 3-page Schedule was
tentatively agreed upon on which the
parties initialed the first page, but not
the second and third pages, containing
a list of extra duties. Included on the
first page was a 5 percent overall
increase in the pay rates for the
various duties listed on the other pages
plus the statement, "It is agreed that
Recent Developments is a regular
feature of The Illinois Public Employee
Relations Report. It highlights recent
legal developments of interest to the
public employment relations commu-
nity. This issue focuses on develop-
ments under the two collective bar-
gaining statutes.
IELRA Developments
Charter Schools
In Cambridge Lakes Education
Association, IEA-NEA v. Northern
Kane Educational Corporation/Cam-
bridge Lakes Charter School, No.
2008-RC-0013-C (IELRB 2008), the
IELRB held that a charter school was
an educational employer subject to the
IELRA. Cambridge Lakes Education
Association filed a majority interest
petition, seeking to represent a
bargaining unit of employees at
Cambridge Lakes Charter School,
which included both full-time teachers
and the positions of Speech/Language
Pathologist and Learning Needs
Specialists. The ALJ determined: (1)
that the chartering entity, Northern
Kane Educational Corporation ("North-
ern Kane") was an educational
employer and; (2) that the Specialists
could not be included in the teachers’
bargaining unit. Northern Kane
challenged the first determination,
alleging that the Charter Schools Law
exempted charter schools from the
jurisdiction of the IELRB. The
Association challenged the second
determination. The IELRB affirmed
the ALJ's Recommended Decision and
Order as modified.
As for the first determination, the
IELRB held that it has jurisdiction
over the governing bodies of charter
schools. The IELRB noted that the
IELRA confers jurisdiction on the
IELRB over "educational employers."
Although Northern Kane was a
private not-for-profit corporation, the
IELRB determined that charter
schools are part of the public education
system and, therefore, their governing
bodies are educational employers as
defined in the IELRA.
As for Northern Kane's contention
that the Charter Schools Law
exempted charter schools from the
jurisdiction of the IELRB, the IELRB
determined that Northern Kane had
misread the statute. The Charter
Schools Law provides, “A charter
school is exempt from all other State
laws and regulations in the School
Code governing public schools and
local school board policies, except the
following . . .”  105 ILCS 5/27A-5(g).
The IELRA is not among the
enumerated exceptions.  The IELRB,
however, reasoned that the IELRA
governs relations between educational
employers and their employees, rather
than  public schools and local school
board policies. Consequently, the
IELRB held that the Charter Schools
Law does not exclude charter schools
from IELRA coverage.  The IELRB
also noted that the charter issued to
Northern Kane specified that it would
be subject to the IELRA.
As for the bargaining unit determi-
nation, the IELRB held that the
Specialists did not share a sufficient
community of interest with the full-
time teachers to justify their inclusion
in the bargaining unit. The IELRB
noted that the Specialists had been
hired by an individual school official,
worked on-call and so had varying
hours, were paid hourly, and did not
qualify for paid vacation and personal
days, whereas full-time teachers were
hired by a panel of four school officials,
worked fixed hours, were paid an
annual salary, and received paid
vacation and personal time. Further-
more, the Specialists and full-time
teachers received different benefits
packages. The IELRB also noted that,
although the Specialists presumably
desired to be included in the
bargaining unit, in this particular
case the employees’ desires regarding
the bargaining unit did not outweigh
the disparate communities of interest.
Duty to Bargain
Recent
Developments
  
 IPER REPORT Winter 2009
8
the Board retains the right to
eliminate positions on the Extra Duty
Compensation Schedule." In April
2006, the Association determined that
the prior rate of $25.00 for extended
detention duty should be deleted from
the Schedule to avoid confusion over
the rates.  Thus, an Association co-
president e-mailed the District's
superintendent, stating that "the
Extended Detention was to be
removed."  In response, the District
removed the duty from the Schedule
entirely, although it continued using
teachers for extended detention duty
into the 2006-2007 school year and
paid them the higher agreed pay rates.
Ultimately, the Schedule was at-
tached to the collective bargaining
agreement without the extended
detention duty included and the
agreement was signed by both the
District and Association. The Associa-
tion never noticed the change.  At the
grievance arbitration, it was clear
that neither party actually proposed
removing the extended detention duty
entirely during the negotiations and
the District's superintendent could not
recall seeing a tentative agreement
calling for such removal.  As of October
10, 2006, the District shifted the
extended detention duty from teachers
to non-bargaining unit administrators
without ever eliminating the duty.
In its unfair labor practice charge,
the Association argued that the
elimination of extended detention duty
was never bargained for nor tenta-
tively agreed to and the District
continued to abide by the terms of the
2005 tentative agreement by using
teachers into the 2006 school year and
paying those teacher the agreed upon 5
percent higher rate.  These facts, the
Association argued, established that
the District unlawfully refused to
bargain and thereby interfered with
the teachers' rights under the IELRA.
By contrast, the District argued that it
did not unilaterally remove extended-
detention duty because an Association
representative directed this removal
in an e-mail to the District's
superintendent and the collective
bargaining agreement was fully
executed by both the District and
Association without extended deten-
tion duty included in the extra duty
Schedule.
The IELRB rejected both of the
District's arguments.  Quoting Board
of Education, Granite City Commu-
nity Unit School District No. 9 v.
Sered, 366 Ill.App.3d 330, 850 N.E.2d
821 (1st Dist. 2006), the Board held
that when a '[c]ase involves a labor
agreement, technical rules of contract
do not apply.'" Moreover, the Illinois
Appellate Court decision in that case
stressed that "[a] meeting of the minds
of the parties must occur before a labor
contract is created" and that a
manifested intent "to abide by agreed-
upon terms" can create a labor
agreement even in the absence of a
writing.  Relying on these precedents,
the IELRB concluded that 2005
tentative agreement and Schedule
constituted a "meeting of the minds" as
to the extended detention duty issue
because both parties initialed that
version of the Schedule and the
District continued to abide by that
version of the Schedule by employing
and paying teachers at the agreed-
upon rate into 2006.  By contrast,
there was no "meeting of the minds" as
to any elimination of the extended
detention duty since neither party ever
proposed its elimination and the
District's superintendent could not
recall ever seeing a tentative agree-
ment calling for this elimination.  The
IELRB called the Association co-
president's e-mail "poorly worded" and
determined that it did not control the
case's disposition.
The IELRB also rejected District
arguments that the Association's
failure to initial all three pages on the
2005 tentatively-agreed Schedule and
its failure to notice the removal of the
extended detention duty from the
agreement is signed mandated a
decision in its favor.  Finally, the
IELRB rejected the District argument
that it was permitted to reassign the
detention supervision responsibilities
under the Schedule's clause allowing
the District to "eliminate positions on
the Extra Duty Compensation Sched-
ule." The IELRB found that the
District had not actually eliminated
the duty, but rather had merely
reassigned it to non-bargaining unit
employees.
IPLRA Developments
In Illinois Council of Police v. ILRB,
899 N.E.2d 1199 (Ill.App. 1st Dist.
2008), the First Appellate District
upheld the ILRB's dismissal of a
petition by the Illinois Council of Police
(ICOP) to sever a group of peace
officers from an existing mixed
bargaining unit made up of peace
officers and non-peace officers.  ICOP
appealed the dismissal arguing that
the Board erred by applying its
traditional severance test rather than
adopting the less stringent severance
test adopted  in County of St. Clair v.
Ill. Fraternal Order of Police, 18 PERI
2015 (ISLRB, 2002) or a test proposed
by ICOP.
Since 1967, the peace officers
employed by the Metropolitan Water
Reclamation District were part of a
mixed bargaining unit and had the
title of "security officers."  In 1987, the
union representing the peace officers,
Fireman and Oilers Union, Local 7
(Local 7), agreed to change the title
from "security officer" to "police
officer."  At the time of ICOP's petition
to sever the police officers, they were
represented by Local 7 and party to a
collective bargaining agreement sched-
uled to expire three months after the
petition was filed.  Local 7 opposed the
severance petition arguing that the
police officers were part of a historic
bargaining unit and thus the unit was
presumptively valid. Further, it ar-
gued that the peace officers and the
non-peace officers in the unit had daily
Bargaining Units
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have been lawful at the time of the
vote. The court further held that the
CTA's actions in response to the
union's vote violated section 10(a)(1) of
the IPLRA.
The CTA and union were in the
midst of negotiating a new contract
when the union held its regular
elections to choose two delegates to
attend the union's convention.  With-
out notifying the CTA of its intention
to do so, the union included a ballot
item to poll employee support of a
strike.  The union posted the results of
the ballot, and subsequently distrib-
uted handbills warning the public of
possible service disruptions.
In addition to filing an unfair labor
practice charge with the ILRB, the
CTA sent the union multiple letters
alleging unfair and illegal conduct by
the union, denied the union permis-
sion to run a subsequent election on
CTA property, and disseminated two
memoranda threatening discipline for
distributing the handbills.
The CTA argued that a strike by
employees would be illegal and that
actions in furtherance of an unlawful
strike constituted a failure to bargain
in good faith. The CTA claimed that a
strike by the union's members could
not possibly satisfy the requirements
of Section 17(a) of the IPLRA.  The CTA
argued that the strike authorization
ballot item violated Section 17(a)
because a subsequent strike would be
unlawful. The court rejected the
arguments.  Although Section 17(a) of
the IPLRA sets out requirements for
lawful strikes by public employees, the
CTA erred in reasoning that the
requirements of Section 17(a) also
apply to acts in preparation or
contemplation of a strike.  The plain
language of Section 17(a) of the IPLRA
indicates that the section's require-
ments pertain only to actual strikes.
Further, the court held that the ILRB
correctly defined a strike authoriza-
tion vote as an internal union poll,
quite distinct from an actual strike.
The court affirmed the ILRB conclu-
interactions with each other, Local 7
adequately represented the police
officers, and police and non-police
employees shared many terms and
conditions of employment.  It further
argued that ICOP would not be able to
meet the requirements of the Board's
traditional severance test which
required it to demonstrate that the
unit that was seeking severance: (1)
shared a significant and distinct
community of interest, and (2) had
conflicts with other segments of the
existing bargaining unit or a record of
ineffective and unresponsive represen-
tation of their peculiar interests.
ICOP argued that the traditional
severance test should not apply. In
County of St. Clair, the Board allowed
severance of police officers from a
combined unit where the union which
represented the combined unit con-
sented to the severance. Further,
ICOP argued, if the Board did not
apply the standard in County of St.
Clair, it should adopt a test which
would require the petitioning union to
establish: (1) the employees to be
severed are police officers who are in a
mixed unit of non peace officers; (2)
employees have complied with section
9(a)(1) of the Act by having a labor
organization acting on their behalf
demonstrating 30 percent of the
employees wish to be represented by
the union; and (3) there is no
certification or contract bar.  It further
argued that the Act disfavors mixed
bargaining units consisting of peace
and non-peace officers.
After numerous submissions by
both parties, the ALJ issued his
recommended decision and order and
dismissed ICOP's petition without
holding a hearing. The ALJ's  con-
cluded that the peace officers in the
unit and the non-peace employees
shared many of the same terms and
conditions of employment. He also con-
cluded that Local 7 had adequately
represented the police officers. Finally,
the ALJ determined that ICOP had
failed to make any factual allegations
sufficient to meet the Board's
traditional severance test and rejected
ICOP's argument that the ALJ should
apply its less stringent test or the test
established in County of St. Clair. The
Board affirmed the ALJ's dismissal of
the severance petition.
The court affirmed the Board's
position that it may dismiss a petition
for severance of a bargaining unit
without a hearing where the Board has
reasonable cause to believe that the
petition was not appropriate. It
concluded that in light of ICOP's
failure to present sufficient evidence to
establish either prong of the Board's
traditional severance test, the ALJ
properly dismissed the petition with-
out a hearing. Moreover, the court con-
cluded that the ALJ and the Board
properly rejected ICOP's invitation to
apply a less stringent severance
standard.  The court disagreed with
ICOP's position that in light of the
legislature's position that a mixed
bargaining unit of peace officers and
non-peace employees was presump-
tively invalid, the less stringent
standard should be applied.  Although
the court acknowledged there was
some disfavor toward such a mixed
bargaining unit, such mixed units are
permitted where the parties to a
collective bargaining relationship
agree to the mixed unit.  Furthermore,
the court concluded that the standard
established in County of St. Clair was
inapposite because it was applied
where the union seeking severance of
the police officers was already in a
collective bargaining relationship and
the parties consented to sever the
police officers from the mixed unit.
Duty to Bargain
InChicagoTransit Authority v. ILRB,
325 Ill.Dec. 443, 898 N.E.2d 176
(Ill.App.1st Dist. 2008), the First
District Appellate Court held that
Amalgamated Transit Union Local
241 did not fail to bargain in good faith,
when it conducted a strike authoriza-
tion vote, even if a strike would not
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315/9(a-5). The General Assembly
adopted section 9(a-5) in an effort to
streamline and speed up the process for
certification of an exclusive bargain-
ing representative.  In County of Du
Page, three major issues were
addressed by the court:  (1) whether a
petitioning union may demonstrate
majority interest by providing evi-
dence in the form of only dues
deduction authorization cards or
whether additional evidence is re-
quired; (2) whether the employer is
entitled to review a union's evidence of
majority interest; and (3) whether the
Board's determination of certification
of the union is litigable.
The petitioning union, Metropolitan
Alliance of Police (MAP) sought to
represent a unit of county deputy
sheriffs.  In support of its certification
petition, MAP submitted signed dues
authorization cards as evidence that a
majority of the bargaining unit
members supported MAP as their
exclusive bargaining representative.
The county and sheriff opposed the
petition arguing that section 9(a-5)
required the union to submit both dues
deduction authorization cards and
some other evidence of majority
support.  It further argued that the
ILRB's regulation which required a
petitioning union to submit dues
deduction authorization cards as
evidence of majority support contra-
dicted the requirements of the statute
and thus, were invalid.  Finally, the
employer argued that it was entitled to
copies of the union's evidence.  The
ILRB rejected all of the employers'
arguments and certified MAP as the
exclusive bargaining representative.
On review, the appellate court
vacated the ILRB's decision and
determined that the statute required
additional evidence of majority sup-
port.  Thus, it ruled certification of
MAP as the exclusive bargaining
representative was against the mani-
fest weight of the evidence and the
Board erred in certifying MAP.
Moreover, the appellate court ruled
that the ILRB's regulation was invalid
insofar as it required only evidence of
dues deduction authorization cards to
establish majority support for union.
It further instructed the ILRB to adopt
regulations providing for the submis-
sion of the evidence it relied upon in its
determination of certification when
the issue is before a reviewing court so
that the court could determine
whether the Board's ruling on the
certification petition was based on
sufficient evidence.  It concluded that
redacted copies of the dues deduction
authorization cards should be pro-
vided.
The Illinois Supreme Court held
that the statute only required the
union to submit dues deduction
authorization cards as evidence of
majority support and no other
additional evidence.  In reaching this
conclusion, the court evaluated the
statute and the regulations.  The
statute provided,  "[T]he Board shall
ascertain the employees' choice of
employee organization, on the basis of
dues deduction authorization and
other evidence. . ."  5 ILCS 315/9(a-5).
The language contained in the ILRB
regulations provided that the showing
of interest in support of a certification
petition "may consist of authorization
cards, petitions, or any other evidence
that demonstrates that of a majority of
the employees which to be represented
by the union. . ."  80 Ill. Adm. Code
1210.80(d)(2)(A). After initially con-
cluding that the statute was ambigu-
ous on the issue of whether a
petitioning union was required to
provide evidence in addition to the
dues deduction authorization cards,
the court evaluated the legislative
history of Section 9(a-5).  In light of the
legislation's purpose which was
contained in the legislative history
and the interpretation of similar
legislation adopted in the New York
legislature, the court concluded that
the meaning of "and" in this context
was in the disjunctive and therefore
unions were not required to submit
sion that a strike authorization vote is
protected activity under the IPLRA.
The court held that the union's
strike authorization vote, posting of
the voting results, and distribution of
handbills to the public did not
constitute a Section 10(b)(4) refusal to
bargain in good faith. The union's
handbills informed the public of the
union's labor dispute with the CTA,
warned that the dispute could result in
disruption of public transportation
services, and encouraged the public to
voice support of the union by
contacting the CTA's president.  The
court observed that the union's
activities did not even rise to the level
of lawful economic pressure, but stated
that if they did, they were consistent
with good faith bargaining.
The court also affirmed the ILRB's
holding that the CTA's retaliatory
conduct constituted an unfair labor
practice.  In response to the union's
lawful activities, the CTA, for the first
time in twenty-five years, refused to
allow union elections on CTA property;
and the CTA threatened discipline up
to discharge for employees who
continued to distribute the union's
handbill.  The handbill was a lawful
exercise of public employee rights to
communicate to third parties,  because
(1) it acknowledged the existence of a
labor dispute with the employer, and
(2) it was not maliciously untrue.
Thus, the CTA's threats of discipline
for distributing the handbill and its
retaliation for including the strike
authorization ballot item unlawfully
interfered with the employees' rights.
Majority Interest Petitions
In County of Du Page v. ILRB, 185
L.R.R.M. 2728, 2008 WL 5246054 (Ill.
2008), the Illinois Supreme Court
interpreted a provision contained in
the IPLRA which allows for the
certification of a union as the exclusive
bargaining representative upon a
showing of a majority of interest of
bargaining unit members. 15 ILCS
11
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court stated, "[t]he legislature would
not have provided a streamlined 'card
check' procedure for union recognition
on the one hand, but on the other hand
provide an employer the ability to
delay a certification order by allowing
a fishing expedition in the union's
evidence of support."
The court remanded the issue of the
appropriateness of the bargaining unit
to the appellate court in light of its
ruling and it vacated the award of
attorney fees to the employer in light of
its determination that the Board's
regulations were not invalid.
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additional evidence beyond dues
deduction authorization cards to
establish majority support.  In light of
its conclusion with respect to the
statute, the court concluded that the
regulation adopted by the Board
relating to Section 9(a-5) was not
invalid.
The court also addressed the issue of
confidentiality regarding the dues
deduction authorization cards and
rejected the employers' argument that
they were entitled to review evidence
demonstrating a majority interest in
certifying the union as the exclusive
bargaining representative.  The court
agreed with the ILRB's position that
disclosure of the dues deduction
authorization cards to the employers
would effectively chill the exercise of
employees’ statutory rights to freedom
of association, self-organization and
union representation.  Although it
acknowledged that redacted dues
deduction cards would address the
Board and the union's concerns
regarding employee confidentiality,
the court disagreed that it was even
necessary to disclose the cards to the
employer or the court in light of its
conclusion that Section 9(a-5) deliber-
ately limited the role of the employer in
the certification petition. Moreover,
the court rejected the Appellate
Court's argument that the dues
deduction authorization cards were
necessary for the reviewing court to
ensure that the ILRB had sufficient
evidence to certify a particular union
as the exclusive bargaining represen-
tative.  The court concluded that in
light of the language and purpose of
section 9(a-5) and the Board's
regulations, a determination made by
the Board with respect to certification
of an exclusive bargaining representa-
tive by a showing of majority support
is not subject to judicial review.  The
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